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LEGISLATION
INTERSTATE, AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS

The New York State legislature has recently implemented the
right of a convict to a speedy trial of charges still outstanding against
him, and has adopted an agreement which, if enacted by other states,
will extend this right to a convict incarcerated in one state with
charges against him in another.'
The Federal Constitution 2 and many state constitutions 3 guarantee an accused the right to a speedy trial. Most states which lack
4
While
this constitutional guarantee protect this right by statute.
most jurisdictions impose upon the accused the burden of insisting
upon his rights,5 once the accused does so, the burden is then upon
the state to try him with all due speed. 6 Many states provide by
statute for'dismissal 7 of the indictment if trial is not held within cer-

tain periods of time.
The right to a speedy trial is usually recognized when the accused is serving a prison term in the same jurisdiction for a previous
offense.8 However, when the accused is a convict in another state,
or in a federal prison, the indicting state has no absolute right to the
custody of the other sovereign's prisoner, and a delay of the trial
until he has served his sentence in the other state is usually held to
be a reasonable delay.9 Furthermore, this delay has been held rea"N.Y. CODE CaUm. PROc. §§ 669-a, 669-b (Supp. 1957).
2U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3See, e.g., ALA. CoNsT. art. 1, §6; CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 13; MINN.
CoNsT. art. 1, § 6.
4 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-106 (1948) ; NEV. REv. STAT. § 169.160;
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 8.
5 See Pietch v. United States, 110 F.2d 817 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 310

U.S. 648 (1940); McCandless v. District Court, 245 Iowa 599, 61 N.W.2d 674
(1953) ; Goss v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. App. 51, 274 S.W.2d 697 (1954). But
see People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955); People v. Perry,
196 Misc. 922, 96 N.Y.S.2d 517 (County Ct. 1949).
6 See Flagg v. State, 11 Ga. App. 37, 74 S.E. 562 (1912) ; McCandless v.
District Court, note 5 supra.
7 See, e.g., Colo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-7-12 (1953); IOWA CoDE ANN.

§ 7952 (1950); N.Y. CODE CRim. PRoc. § 668.
B See, e.g., Frankel v. Woodrough, 7 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1925) ; People v.
Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955) ; State ex rel. Moreau v. Bond,
114 Tex. 468, 271 S.W. 379 (1925) ; State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 98 Pac. 122
(1908).
9 See, e.g., Nolan v. United States, 163 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1947) ; Ex parte
Schechtel, 103 Colo. 77, 82 P.2d 762 (1938); Raine v. State, 143 Tenn. 168,
226 S.W. 189 (1920).
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sonable even where the prosecuting state had made no attempt to
obtain custody of the accused from the incarcerating state.'0 It is
this situation, and its undesirable results, which the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 11 is designed to remedy.
The Agreement provides procedures whereby a convict in one
party state may be expeditiously tried on charges outstanding in another party state, at the instance of either the convict or the prosecuting state. This allows a convict in state X to precipitate the disposition of untried charges against him in state Y, both states being,
of course, parties to the Agreement. The basic procedure is this:
The convict directs a request for trial to state Y; state Y may then
take temporary custody of him for trial. 12 If state Y does not actually try him within 180 days after his request, however, the court
having jurisdiction of the charges in state Y will, unless the prosecuting officer shows good cause for the delay, dismiss the indictment.13
This dismissal affects all charges outstanding against the convict in
state Y,14 even those of which he had not been informed. Nor would
it seem that the accused must utilize the procedures of the Agreement.
Since under the Agreement the prosecutor has the power to request,
and may ordinarily expect to get, custody of the accused from the
other state,' 5 no longer may the fact that the accused is incarcerated
there negate his right to a speedy trial within the next term of court.'
The Agreement specifically withholds the benefit of its provisions from one who has been adjudged mentally ill.17 Since one who
is mentally ill cannot conduct his defense and therefore cannot be
tried,' 8 he is not allowed to take advantage of a law under which failure to try him might result in dismissal of the charges against him.
Section 669-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure is, in effect,
an intrastate counterpart of the Agreement. One who is presently
10 See Ex parte Schechtel, note 9 supra; Raine v. State, note 9 supra.

" N.Y.

CODE

Calm. PROC. § 669-b (Supp. 1957). "An interstate detainer is

a request, usually in the form of a warrant or hold order, to detain a fugitive

from justice wanted by the demanding state ... when the fugitive is already
in custody on a different charge in the state to which the request is directed... .
See Note, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 1190-91 (1948). The usual result of a detainer

is that the requesting state will be notified before the prisoner's release. The
Agreement on Detainers applies only when a detainer has actually been lodged
against a prisoner.
12

N.Y.

CODE

CRiM. PRoc. § 669-b, art. III (Supp. 1957); id. art. V (a).

While the convict is travelling to and from trial, and while he is being tried,

his sentence continues to run. Id. art. V(f).
'3 Id.art. V(c).
14Id. art. III(d).

'RId. art. IV. The governor of the incarcerating state may disapprove the

request, however. Id. art. IV (a).
16 Cf. N.Y. CoDE CGim. PROC. § 668; People v. Peters, 198 Misc. 956, 101
N.Y.S.2d 755 (County Ct. 1951).
17 N.Y. CODE CRim. PROC. § 669-b, art. VI (b) (Supp. 1957).

'sFreeman v. People, 4 Denio 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847); In re Smith, 25
N.M. 48, 176 Pac. 819 (1918).
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under imprisonment in New York and who has charges outstanding
against him in New York may request trial of the untried charges.
If trial is not held within 180 days, the charges may be dismissed.
The section will not affect existing law to the same degree as the
Agreement, since in New York a convict already has the statutory
right to move for the dismissal of the indictment if no trial has been
held during the next term of court.' 9 However, by marking a definite 180-day deadline, after which charges must be dismissed unless
good cause for a continuance has been shown, the new act seems to
provide a more efficacious remedy to the convict denied a speedy trial.
Section 673 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has heretofore
provided that the dismissal of an action, in the instances specified by
that chapter of the Code, is a bar to subsequent prosecution of the
same offense if the offense is a misdemeanor, but not if it is a felony.
This section has now been amended to include, as being barred, subsequent prosecutions of felonies dismissed under the provisions of20 the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers or its intrastate counterpart.
The Agreement on Detainers seems to be a logical and necessary
step in protecting the rights of those accused of crimes. Under the
previous law the mere fact that another state's permission was needed
to obtain custody of the accused was considered a valid reason for
postponing trial. This was a harsh exception to the right to a speedy
trial, especially where the prosecuting state had made no effort to
secure temporary custody of the accused from the incarcerating state.
Under the new law an accused will be better able to prepare his defense since the evidence and the memories of the witnesses would be
fresher.
But there is another advantage accruing uniquely to convicts.
Previously a convict with other charges pending against him was a
problem to penal institutions. He was denied certain privileges and
treatment and, because of the uncertainty of the total length of his
stay in prison, a proper program of rehabilitation was difficult. If
he was subsequently acquitted of the charges against him, this previous denial of trustee status, parole and other benefits was unjustified. 1
Now all charges may be tried with reasonable speed, and his future
to some extent predicted.
19 See N.Y.

CODE CRm.

PRoc. § 668; People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130

N.E2d
891 (1955).
20
See N.Y. CoDE Cam. Peoc. § 673 (Supp. 1957). When § 669-a was
enacted, § 673 was amended so as to bar the subsequent prosecution of felonies
dismissed under the new section. When § 669-b was enacted three days later,
the first amendment was ignored and the original § 673 was amended so as to
include only the felonies dismissed under § 669-b. The literal effect of this
second amendment is to repeal the first, and to leave out of the scope of § 673
felonies dismissed under § 669-a. However, this seems to be merely an administrative
error, to be later corrected.
21
Memorandum of Joint Legislative COmmittee on Interstate Cooperation,
1957 N.Y. LEars. ANqNUAL 40-41. See Note, 48 CoLum. L. Rv. 1190, 1192-93
(1948).
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The Agreement contemplates adoption by the several states, the
federal government, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and United
States territories and possessions.22 Its efficacy depends, of course,
upon its adoption by other jurisdictions. The more that adopt it, the
more effective it will be. However, from New York's point of view,
only will in itself be a sufficient
an adoption by the federal government
23
justification for its retention.

NEW YORK STATE RETAIL INSTALMENT SALES ACT

An ambitious legislative program, which heralds the beginning
of an era of extensive regulation in the retail sales field in New York,
was completed October 1, 1957. As of that date, virtually every sale
of goods and related services made under a retail instalment sales
plan within the state became subject to public regulation.'
Background
"Instalment selling is generally understood to mean the process
of selling goods or services, with or without immediate part payment
on a contract by which the purchaser agrees to pay the purchase price
in regular, periodic instalments, either to the seller or to some other
agency which may acquire the deferred payment contract." 2
Although used in America to a limited extent a century and a
half ago, this form of selling has enjoyed significant popularity only
during the past thirty years. During these three decades the economy
of the nation has become geared to and based upon the mass production and mass distribution of consumer goods. As an integral part
of this new economic system, instalment selling by the "easy budget
plan" has become firmly enrooted in American retail transactions.3
N.Y. CoDE Cim. PROC. § 669-b, art. II(a) (Supp. 1957).
sMemorandum of Joint Legislative Committee on Interstate Cooperation,

22
2

1957 N.Y. LEais. AN uAL 42. It appears that many of the cases in this area
involve an accused denied a speedy trial by a state because he was a federal
prisoner.
'See Memorandum of Consumer Council to the Governor, McKINNvY's
SEss ON LAws OF NEw YoR 2113 (1957).

2 Donaldson, An Analysis of Retail Installment Sales Legislation, 19 RocRY
MT. L. Rnv. 135 (1947), citing Nugent and Henderson, Installment Selling
and the Consumer: A Brief for Regulation, 173 AixiALs 93-103 (1934).
SFor an excellent history of the growth of instalment buying and an
analysis of the factors contributing to its growth, see Cox, THE EcONomIcs
OF INSTALMENT BUYING 62-74 (1948).

